Nuclear power - The Sustainability Management Wiki

Authors:
Edited by: Neha Siju, Mostafa Abdelrahman
Last updated: May 18, 2026

Executive summary

Nuclear power generates electricity by using heat from nuclear fission to produce steam that drives turbines. It delivers firm, dispatchable power with very low operational greenhouse gas emissions and a small land footprint, which can support decarbonization strategies where grid reliability and space constraints matter. Reactor technologies have evolved from early Generation I designs to today’s Generation II fleet, with Generation III upgrades and advanced designs—including small modular reactors (SMRs)—aiming to improve safety, efficiency, and siting flexibility.

Economic performance remains the central constraint for new build. Nuclear projects are capital intensive, highly exposed to financing conditions, and vulnerable to delays and cost overruns, which can raise the levelized cost of electricity relative to wind and solar. At the same time, nuclear can contribute system-level value by providing long-lived assets, reducing exposure to fuel-price volatility, and supporting grid stability as variable renewables expand. Organizations evaluating nuclear options typically weigh upfront cost and schedule risk against reliability benefits, potential avoided emissions, and the availability of public-private financing structures.

Ecological performance is mixed. Across the life cycle, nuclear power can achieve low carbon intensity comparable to other low-carbon technologies, but it produces high-level radioactive waste that requires secure management over long time horizons. Progress on deep geological disposal is improving the feasibility of permanent solutions, yet governance, community consent, and long-term stewardship remain decisive factors for legitimacy. Additional environmental considerations include uranium mining impacts, accident risk with potentially long-lasting contamination, and growing climate-related constraints on cooling water and thermal discharge.

Social, political, and legal factors strongly influence deployment outcomes. Public acceptance depends on trust, transparency, equity, and the credibility of safety and emergency preparedness regimes. Policy frameworks shape investment through permitting, market design, and access to sustainable finance, while liability rules and international safeguards address accident compensation and non-proliferation risks. For organizations, effective nuclear strategy therefore combines technical assessment with robust stakeholder engagement, supply-chain and compliance governance, and realistic planning for full lifecycle responsibilities—from financing and operations through decommissioning and waste disposal.

1 Description and history

*Figure 1: Timeline of nuclear power (own depiction based on¹^,²^,³^,⁴^,⁵^,⁶^,⁷^,⁸^,⁹^,¹⁰)*

Nuclear power is a form of energy derived from processes involving the nucleus, the dense core of atoms. The energy that binds the protons and neutrons within the nucleus is extremely powerful and can be harnessed through nuclear reactions. Specifically, nuclear power plants utilize the process of nuclear fission, in which the nucleus of a heavy atom such as uranium-235 splits into two smaller nuclei, releasing a substantial amount of energy in the form of heat. This heat is then used to produce steam that drives turbines to generate electricity.¹^,²

Nuclear reactors primarily use uranium, a heavy metal with high energy density. Uranium is an abundant natural resource and has been a core fuel in commercial nuclear power plants for more than 60 years.² The global share of nuclear energy in electricity peaked around 17.5 percent in 1996 and currently contributes approximately 9 percent to the global supply.³^,⁴

The history of nuclear power is deeply intertwined with scientific discoveries in physics and chemistry during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In 1895, Wilhelm Röntgen discovered ionizing radiation through his experiments with X-rays. The following year, Henri Becquerel observed that uranium-containing ores such as pitchblende could darken photographic plates, an effect he linked to the emission of alpha and beta radiation.⁵

The foundational breakthrough came in 1938 when Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann demonstrated that bombarding uranium atoms with neutrons resulted in the production of lighter elements like barium. This marked the first observed case of nuclear fission—a process later explained theoretically by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch.⁶ Soon after, physicists including Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard conceptualized the idea of a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. This led to the construction of the Chicago Pile-1, the first nuclear reactor to achieve a self-sustaining chain reaction, in 1942.⁵^,⁶

Initially, the development of nuclear technology was closely linked to military objectives during World War II, particularly through the Manhattan Project. However, post-war initiatives sought to promote peaceful applications of nuclear technology. In 1951, the Experimental Breeder Reactor I (EBR-I) in Idaho, USA, became the first reactor to generate a small amount of electricity from nuclear power.⁵^,⁶ The geopolitical climate of the Cold War also contributed to the civilian application of nuclear technology. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech in 1953 aimed to shift public and international focus toward peaceful nuclear development.⁷ This later culminated in the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957, designed to promote safe and peaceful uses of nuclear technology worldwide.⁸ The USSR was the first to establish a nuclear power plant that supplied electricity to a public grid in 1954, and the United Kingdom followed with the first commercial nuclear power station in 1956.⁵^,⁷

However, the expansion of nuclear energy also brought significant challenges and controversies. The Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979, although not resulting in fatalities, sparked major public concern about reactor safety. The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 had more severe consequences, including deaths and widespread radioactive contamination, which significantly impacted global public perception of nuclear energy.⁶ In 2011 the Fukushima accident in Japan, triggered by a massive earthquake and tsunami, led to core meltdowns and the release of radioactive materials, further reinforcing global concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors in extreme conditions.⁹^,¹⁰

The majority of global nuclear power plants utilize water-cooled reactor designs, particularly Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), which together account for approximately 96% of operational reactors worldwide.¹¹ PWRs use highly pressurized water to prevent it from boiling inside the reactor core, while BWRs allow water to boil directly within the reactor vessel to produce steam. These designs use regular water for both cooling and moderation and are therefore classified as Light Water Reactors. In contrast, the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor uses heavy water, which enables it to run on natural uranium without the need for fuel enrichment. Reactors using this design are categorized as Heavy Water Reactors.³^,¹¹^,¹²^,¹³

These types fall into broader categories known as nuclear generations, which reflect the technological development and safety features of each design. Generation I reactors were developed in the 1950s and 60s, including the world’s first commercial nuclear power plant, Calder Hall in the United Kingdom, which began operation in 1956. These early designs also primarily used natural uranium and graphite for moderation, and the last of them was shut down at the end of 2015. Most currently operating reactors, such as standard PWRs, BWRs, and CANDUs, are considered Generation II.⁵^,⁶^,¹⁴^,¹⁵

Generation III reactors are direct upgrades of Generation II designs, incorporating state-of-the-art improvements in fuel technology, thermal efficiency, safety systems, and modular construction. A key development in Generation III designs is the greater use of passive safety systems that function without active mechanical or human intervention, enhancing reliability and safety. These reactors are also designed for longer operational lifespans and greater efficiency¹¹^,¹⁴^,¹⁵, with several already in use in countries such as China, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.³^,¹⁵

Looking ahead, Generation IV reactors are still under development and represent a more fundamental shift in nuclear technology. These future designs aim to operate at higher temperatures and introduce innovative cooling systems using gases, liquid metals, or molten salt, rather than water. A major goal of Generation IV technology is to implement closed fuel cycles, which would allow reactors to reuse spent fuel and drastically reduce the amount and longevity of radioactive waste. Instead of generating long-lived waste materials, these systems would break them down into shorter-lived byproducts, making nuclear energy more sustainable over the long term.³^,⁴^,¹¹^,¹⁵^,¹⁶

Many of the most advanced Generation III and IV designs are being developed in the form of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). These compact nuclear units offer flexible deployment, enhanced safety features, and economic scalability. With over 90 SMR designs currently in various stages of development, they are expected to play a vital role in the future of nuclear energy, particularly in industrial, remote, or developing regions.³^,¹¹^,¹⁶^,¹⁷^,¹⁸^,¹⁹

Finally, when discussing technological diffusion and advancements, nuclear fusion represents the current frontier of nuclear research. It aims to replicate the process that powers stars by fusing light atomic nuclei to release energy. Unlike fission, fusion produces no long-lived radioactive waste and carries no risk of meltdown. ITER, the world’s largest experimental fusion project, is expected to build its first prototype reactor by 2040, though commercial deployment is likely still several decades away.³^,¹¹^,²⁰^,²¹

2 Economic performance

The economics of nuclear power have become increasingly complex over time, particularly as cost trends diverged significantly from early expectations. Construction costs for nuclear power plants have consistently increased since the deployment of the first reactors, often exceeding initial forecasts and taking two to three times longer to complete than originally planned.³^,²² This trend has been especially visible in countries like France, where nuclear plants completed after 1990 were.²³ times more expensive than those built in the 1970s, even with considerable government subsidies.²²

These rising costs have impacted the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), a standard measure for comparing the lifetime costs of various energy sources. Nuclear energy’s LCOE currently averages around 160 US dollars per megawatt hour ($/MWh), roughly three times higher than that of renewables like wind and solar, which range between $50–$60/MWh.²² Moreover, lifetime extensions for aging reactors cost approximately $40–$55/MWh, which approaches renewable LCOEs but without offering similar flexibility or scalability.¹⁹ Although renewables are cheaper in many scenarios, Lee and Jung (2024) argue that nuclear avoids significant environmental and integration costs, potentially justifying its higher upfront expenses. In their cost-benefit analysis using the Social Cost of Carbon they find that nuclear power avoided environmental impact can outweigh its LCOE disadvantages.²⁴ Additionally, Brouwer and Bergkamp (2021) conducted a scenario analysis comparing wind, solar and nuclear energy especially regarding their costs and land requirements. Even in their best-case scenario for renewable power generation with wind and solar they find evidence that the costs for nuclear energy generation are still cheaper by a small margin. In their worst-case assumption for solar and wind they suggest that nuclear energy becomes an alternative that is close to four times cheaper. During their calculation the results show that in certain national contexts like the Netherlands, nuclear power would save an average Dutch household an estimated 165 euros annually.²⁵ Furthermore, the authors state that grid integration costs are also a big cost factor, which according to them many fellow researchers have been miscalculating. While wind and solar integration costs may escalate at higher penetration rates, nuclear power lowers system costs, potentially saving countries like the Netherlands up to ten billion euros per year.²⁵

One of the most critical economic challenges of nuclear energy lies in its capital intensity. Construction costs represent roughly 70 percent of the total lifetime cost of a new nuclear power project, making it particularly vulnerable to delays and financing issues.²⁶ Looking further into construction costs an analysis by Sovacool et al. (2014) revealed that 97 percent of the 180 observed nuclear power plant constructions had significant cost overruns. Moreover, they found that in general the average construction costs of these plants had been increased by 117 percent.²⁷

Two main financial drivers, capital costs and the cost of capital (i.e., financing interest rates), determine the feasibility and profitability of nuclear projects.²⁶^,²⁸^,²⁹ As a result, nuclear power projects often require a mix of public and private investment mechanisms. According to the IAEA (2024), achieving global climate goals by 2050 would necessitate annual nuclear investments of 125 billion US dollars, demanding innovative financing models. Instruments like green bonds are becoming more relevant, attracting environmentally conscious investors who seek environmental, social, and governance aligned projects. Similarly, collaborative financing models, such as the Finnish Mankala model, allow shared ownership and cost distribution among stakeholders, promoting price stability and reducing investment risk.²⁶ In addition, Lovering et al. (2016), find that there is a general misconception especially among policy makers, that nuclear power construction costs will decrease when their country builds more nuclear power plants throughout time. Lovering et al. (2016) however state that this is not completely true and suggest that the learning-by-doing approach has a positive influence on cost reduction but many other factors like current construction policies, regulatory frameworks and even historical events play a significant role alongside it.²⁹

The financing conditions vary globally. Developing economies often face high financing costs due to low credit ratings and a lack of long-term investment vehicles. In these contexts, blended financing and multilateral support, including assistance from development banks, could play a pivotal role in enabling nuclear investment. On the other hand, countries with ongoing nuclear construction experience, such as China and Russia, benefit from streamlined processes, efficient supply chains, and favorable regulatory environments, allowing them to keep costs significantly lower than western economies. There is also growing interest in modularization and standardization, particularly through the aforementioned SMRs.²⁶

Despite its economic hurdles, nuclear energy remains a significant player in the global energy market. The nuclear industry also correlates strongly with research output: countries with larger nuclear fleets tend to lead in nuclear science, technology, and safety research.³⁰ Compared to fossil fuels, nuclear power offers long-term economic advantages due to minimal fuel price volatility and long operational lifespans.¹¹^,¹⁸^,¹⁹^,²⁵^,²⁸ Despite these advantages decommissioned “brownfield” can host as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) or large-scale energy storage, utilizing existing high-capacity grid connections and transportation infrastructure.³¹ These sites can also be repurposed as industrial parks or designated “Energy Hubs” to support hydrogen production, which can help minimize the capital costs related to the development of new “greenfield” sites.³² These redevelopment options are crucial in sustaining the economic stability in the area and the stakeholders’ confidence in the long-run transition beyond the nuclear activities.³³

Significant economic barriers remain, including aging infrastructure, the high costs of waste management, and the need for costly upgrades to ensure reactor safety 30 alongside the mentioned construction and overhead costs. When considering these end-of-life economics,costs of decommissioning a large-scale reactor vary from USD 500 million to over USD 1 billion, or USD 500 to USD 1.500 per kWe. These costs mainly comprise the costs of labor intensive activities as well as waste management fees, which together account for up to 80% of the total costs.³³ The total time frames for a decommissioning project vary from 20 to 30 years if an immediate dismantling approach is used, but it can be extended to 60 years or more if a “deferred dismantling” approach is used.³² However, while these absolute figures seem formidable “Decommissioning costs are about 9-15% of the initial capital cost of a nuclear power plant. But when discounted over the lifetime of the plant, they contribute only a few percent to the investment cost and even less to the generation cost. In the USA they account for 0.1-0.2 ¢/kWh, which is no more than 5% of the cost of the electricity produced”.³⁴ Some scholars argue that investments in new nuclear plants delay climate action due to long construction timelines and escalating costs, making them less favorable compared to renewables.³⁵ Others critique nuclear development as prestige-driven rather than safety- or cost-oriented, particularly in its early phases.³⁶

Nevertheless, nuclear offers reliable baseload electricity, a feature that is increasingly valued in energy systems facing intermittent renewable generation.³⁷ Although solar capacity growth has surpassed that of nuclear globally, nuclear still delivers more electricity per unit of installed capacity.³⁸

3 Ecological performance

Nuclear power is frequently presented as a low-carbon energy source, particularly in comparison to fossil fuels. One of its most cited ecological advantages is its low life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. According to Mathew (2022) across the entire lifecycle – from uranium mining and fuel processing to construction, operation, and decommissioning – nuclear power emits an estimated 10-15 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt hour (gCO₂-eq/kWh). This is comparable to wind energy (15-25 gCO₂-eq/kWh) and considerably lower than fossil-based sources like coal (820 gCO₂-eq/kWh) or natural gas (490 gCO₂-eq/kWh).¹¹

At the national level, the contribution of nuclear energy to GHG mitigation is substantial. In China alone, replacing fossil fuels with nuclear power could lead to 349-390 teragram CO₂ savings annually today, and up to 831-957 teragram CO₂ by 2030. Globally, nuclear energy prevents approximately.²¹ billion tons of CO₂ emissions annually, equivalent to removing 250 million cars from circulation.²³ According to Lee and Jung (2024), nuclear plants in Upstate New York alone avoided 736 million US dollars in social costs annually through lower emissions of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitric oxide, and particulate matter.²⁴ Furthermore, a study by Kharecha and Hansen (2013) also shows that from 1971 to 2009, nuclear power prevented 1.84 million premature deaths related to air pollution and 64 gigatonnes of CO₂-eq emissions. Projected into the future, an expanded global nuclear rollout from 2010 to 2050 could avoid between 80-240 gigatonnes CO₂, preventing an additional 420.000 to 7.04 million premature deaths depending on which energy sources it replaces.³⁹

Despite its low operational emissions, nuclear power is burdened by the issue of long-lived radioactive waste, which is subject to a comprehensive classification process in accordance with its activity levels and the hazard it presents. Very Low Level Waste (VLLW), which is in the form of rubble and soil, is suitable for near-surface disposal, whereas Low Level Waste (LLW), which is in the form of tools and clothing, requires basic containment measures to be employed on it. Intermediate Level Waste (ILW), which is in the form of reactor components, requires substantial shielding to be provided to the personnel involved in the process. Finally, High Level Waste (HLW), which is in the form of spent fuel, is thermally hot and radioactive in nature and requires deep geological disposal to be provided to it.⁴⁰ A typical 1000 MW electric nuclear reactor generates approximately 30 tons of high-level radioactive waste annually, compared to the 300.000 tons of ash produced by a coal plant of similar capacity.⁴¹ While smaller in volume, nuclear waste remains toxic for tens of thousands of years, posing a unique intergenerational challenge.³⁵

Efforts to mitigate this issue include advanced reactor technologies that aim to reduce both the volume and longevity of waste. For example, next-generation systems claim to cut waste by over 99 percent, reducing its lifespan significantly.¹⁶ However, these systems remain largely at the development or pilot phase, and no country has yet implemented a permanent, geologically secure waste repository for high-level nuclear waste.³⁵ While previous objections had argued that no permanent geologically safe solution had been implemented, this is now being technically disproven. Finland’s Onkalo Facility is situated at the Olkiluoto facility, the Onkalo facility is the first-ever Deep Geological Repository for high-level spent fuel. It uses the “KBS-3” method, whereby the waste is placed in copper canisters, covered with bentonite clay, and then placed 450 meters underground in crystalline rock. As of 2024, the facility has finished the “trial run of final disposal” (without actual fuel). It is expected to receive the final permit for commissioning, after which it will begin the irreversible disposal of radioactive waste.This achievement attracts other nations, Sweden has already given the go-ahead for a similar facility, and France is working on the Cigéo facility.⁴²

This has led to criticism from scholars like Pieńkowski (2024), who argue that current nuclear practices remain incompatible with the principles of sustainability, particularly because of unsolved waste disposal, decommissioning complexities, and a lack of long-term accountability.⁴³ However, a highly organized, three phase decommissioning process is used to handle these perceived complexities, the most important primary step is the Defueling, which involves the complete removal of all nuclear fuel assemblies from the reactor core and storing them in either wet storage, i.e., spent fuel pools, or dry storage, i.e., Independent Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installations, to allow the fuel to decay and cool down. This process is crucial in reducing the site’s radiological hazard and is considered the transition from an operational to a decommissioning site.⁴⁴ Decontamination is the process of removing contaminants using chemicals, electrolysis, or mechanical means to reduce the residual radioactivity on the surface. Dismantling is the process of removing the physical structures using mechanical means. It can be achieved immediately after shutdown, known as immediate dismantling, or after a period known as “safe enclosure,” to allow the natural decay of the radioactivity, known as deferred dismantling. The process is achieved using a graded approach to ensure that the site meets the requirements to be released from regulatory control.⁴⁵ Finally the need for above-ground interim storage and concerns about leaks or accidents during storage further exacerbate public distrust.⁴⁶^,⁴⁷

Brouwer and Bergkamp (2021) show in their scenario analysis that contrast to wind and solar, nuclear energy is much more land efficient. To produce enough energy for the Netherlands in 2050 by nuclear energy only 120 square kilometer would be required. Compared to solar this would mean more than 148 times as much land would be required. Offshore wind would need 266 times more land than the nuclear alternative and onshore would even double that land demand to 534 times as much.²⁵ This compact footprint is advantageous in countries with limited land availability or dense populations.

However, land use cannot be assessed solely by surface area. Uranium mining, often conducted in remote or ecologically sensitive areas, has led to soil degradation, water pollution, and ecosystem disruption.⁴⁸ Historically, nuclear sites were selected for their remoteness, frequently neglecting local populations and ecosystems, particularly indigenous communities.⁴⁹ To solve this problem, Environmental performance in the mining of uranium focuses on the need to limit the disturbance of the environment by using more refined mining techniques such as In-Situ Leaching, as opposed to the conventional open-pit mining method.⁵⁰ Monitoring activity is mainly focused on the protection of groundwater resources and the long-term stabilization of radioactive tailings to avoid the migration of radionuclides.⁵¹ Moreover, the current operations are also judged on the ability to integrate management systems according to the principles of sustainable development.⁵² Furthermore, A Contemporary best practices in uranium reclamation include the concept of “progressive reclamation,” where the reclamation of the land occurs simultaneously with the mining activity to reduce the long-term environmental footprint of the mining activity.⁵³ This is ensured through the provision of a financial bond to guarantee the safety of the land for future public use without the migration of radionuclides.⁵² Liu et al. (2023) conducted a review of nuclear power plant carbon emissions and found that especially the mining, milling and enrichment of fuel are significant contributors to the carbon footprint of nuclear power. They find that further mitigation strategies in the nuclear fuel cycle, or front end emissions, could severely decrease the overall CO₂ emissions of power plants. Moreover, they state that when it comes to calculating the emissions on construction and operation, that a severe lack of data hinders sophisticated research.²³

The environmental risks of accidents and contamination also pose long-lasting ecological threats. The Chernobyl disaster led to the spread of radioactive aerosols as far as Ireland, contaminating forests, rivers, and agricultural land, and leaving some zones uninhabitable for centuries.⁴⁷ Fukushima’s meltdown caused radiation leaks into the Pacific Ocean, igniting global concerns over food chain contamination.⁵⁴

Nuclear power is often described as a dispatchable and climate-resilient energy source, able to provide stable baseload power and complement intermittent renewables like wind and solar.²⁶ The integration of nuclear energy into multi-vector systems, which combine batteries, solar, hydrogen, or other renewables, offers a promising pathway toward a flexible and decarbonized energy grid.⁵⁵ Countries such as Finland, Norway, and Iceland, which utilize nuclear and hydropower, demonstrate that ecologically sound and secure energy mixes are achievable when nuclear is strategically integrated.

System inegrton and flexibility services

Load following capabilities

In the present day, it is becoming more essential for the newer designs of nuclear power plants to offer the service of “maneuvering” to counter the intermittency of wind and solar power. This is done by controlling the output of the reactor according to the demands of the grid by varying the positions of the control rods or the coolant temperature.⁵⁶ Studies have proved that the addition of flexibility to the system of low carbon energy has reduced the total system costs, especially the costs of expensive fossil fuels for peaking power plants.⁵⁷ Newer designs of reactors are being built to vary the output of the reactor at the same rate as natural gas plants, thereby ensuring the grid’s stability. By this shift from the traditional “baseload” operation, the flexibility of nuclear energy can be harnessed for the benefit of the grid.⁵⁷

Co-Generation (industrial heat & hydrogen)

This is possible through co-generation, also known as sector coupling, where the reactor is able to generate electricity as well as high-temperature heat for industrial use. This heat can then be diverted for use in desalination plants, district heating, or chemical production, thereby enhancing the thermodynamic efficiency of the reactor.⁵⁸ In instances where there is low electricity demand due to high renewable energy output, the reactor is able to generate high-temperature steam for the production of hydrogen through steam electrolysis, which is a clean source of energy.⁵⁹ This is done through the reactor’s “hybrid” mode, where it is able to generate heat at a constant rate, thereby efficiently producing electricity for the grid at varying rates.⁵⁸ This is important for the decarbonization of industries that cannot be electrified.⁵⁹

Coordination with storage and demand response

However, the integration of nuclear energy production along with storage systems as well as demand-side management enables the creation of a “system of systems” that is able to provide the grid with 24/7 carbon-free power.⁶⁰ By making use of Thermal Energy Storage systems like molten salts or steam accumulators, the nuclear reactor is able to store the excess heat generated during periods of high solar or wind production. This excess heat is then used to provide the grid with the power needed during the peak hours of the day.⁶¹ By doing so, the nuclear reactor is able to provide the grid with the power needed as a “virtual battery” in the absence of the need for the installation of huge battery systems for long-duration energy storage.⁶⁰ Moreover, the coordination of the nuclear reactor’s production along with the use of demand response systems where industrial consumption is adjusted in accordance with the supply of the grid is able to provide the grid with the power needed to flatten the “duck curve” of the grid. Ultimately, the above strategy enables organizations to make the best out of their nuclear resources while supporting a grid that is largely powered by variable renewable resources.⁶¹

Moreover, the low geographic dependency of nuclear power makes it a viable option in regions with limited renewable potential.⁶²

Nevertheless, climate change itself threatens nuclear power’s ecological performance. During the 2022 European drought, multiple French reactors were shut down due to insufficient river water for cooling.⁶² These events illustrate the climate vulnerability of thermal power systems, including nuclear. In developing economies, nuclear energy may offer a way to decarbonize rapidly while maintaining energy reliability. According to the IAEA (2024), countries with ongoing nuclear development, such as China and India, benefit from lower capital and environmental costs due to streamlined processes and reduced regulatory burdens.²⁶

Finally, SMRs are highlighted as promising solutions for reducing ecological and logistical barriers. These systems can be deployed in remote areas, operate at higher efficiencies, and reduce GHG emissions by displacing diesel or coal-fired plants. Their modularity also implies lower environmental impact during construction and decommissioning.¹¹^,¹⁸^,¹⁹^,²⁶

From a policy perspective, the inclusion of nuclear projects in green finance frameworks, such as green bonds or sustainability-linked loans, reflects increasing global acknowledgment of the ecological value of nuclear power.²⁶ However, political will and public support remain uneven, especially in the wake of environmental disasters and the influence of post-modern anti-nuclear movements.³⁶^,⁴⁶

When considering the broader picture of ecological sustainability, nuclear energy shows a mixed performance. On the one hand, it enables significant reductions in air pollution, CO₂ emissions, and land usage, and can stabilize grids dominated by renewables.²⁶^,²³ On the other hand, issues of waste management, long-term environmental risks, and public health concerns remain unresolved.³⁰^,³⁵

Recent data confirms the ongoing transformation of the energy sector. In 2023, wind and solar added 460 gigawatts of new capacity globally, compared to a net loss of 1 gigawatt for nuclear. The EU produced 721 terawatt hour from wind and solar, exceeding the 588 terawatt hour generated by nuclear energy.³ These figures suggest a declining ecological role for nuclear in favor of renewables, despite its benefits.¹⁷

Nonetheless, many researchers argue that without nuclear, climate goals would be harder and more expensive to reach.¹¹^,¹⁹^,²⁵^,⁶³^,¹⁶ Emblemsvåg (2024) simulated what would have happened if Germany did not strive toward a nuclear phaseout but rather invested further into that technology. The author finds that nuclear investments could have reduced emissions by 73 percent and halved the cost of the Energiewende to 364 billion euros.⁶⁴

Ultimately, nuclear energy’s ecological footprint is low, but not neutral. It plays an important role in bridging the carbon gap, but must be paired with innovations in waste management, safer technologies, and inclusive energy policies to fully meet sustainability goals.

Waste governance and repositories

The international consensus for managing high-level waste (HLW) and spent fuel is deep geological disposal. This involves placing waste in engineered facilities within stable deep rock formations (200-1.000 meters underground) to provide long-term isolation from the biosphere without relying on active human oversight 61 Several national programs are at various stages of development, facing common challenges in licensing and public acceptance.

Canada: The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) is pursuing a site selection process. In late 2024, it selected a site near Revell Lake in northwestern Ontario, subject to regulatory processes and impact assessments, with operations not expected until the 2040s.⁶⁵f

Spain: Following an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ARTEMIS mission, Spain has developed a new roadmap for a deep geological repository as part of its 7th General Radioactive Waste Plan, consolidating its strategy for HLW and spent fuel.⁶⁶

United Kingdom: The UK is also pursuing a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). The government body Nuclear Waste Services (NWS) is working with two community partnerships in Cumbria, though the program has faced challenges, including a withdrawal from the process by Lincolnshire and critical delivery confidence assessments.⁶⁷

International collaboration: Bodies like the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) facilitate knowledge sharing. Its Expert Group on Regulator-Implementer Dialogue (RIDD) provides a forum to discuss challenges in the pre-licensing and licensing phases of DGR development, emphasizing the critical relationship between regulators and implementers.⁶⁸

Consent-based siting

A major evolution in governance is the move from top-down, “decide-announce-defend” models to consent-based siting, which seeks a willing host community. This approach aims to build trust and legitimacy, though its implementation is fraught with difficulty.

Definition and application: Consent-based siting involves communities voluntarily expressing interest in learning about hosting a facility, with the right to withdraw late into the process.⁶⁷ Canada’s NWMO, for example, committed to finding a “willing host” and seeking the free, prior, and informed consent of impacted Indigenous peoples, in line with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.⁶⁵

Challenges and criticisms: The practice can be contentious. In Canada, the NWMO’s site selection process is facing a judicial review from Eagle Lake First Nation, which argues it was excluded from formal decision-making despite being potentially affected, challenging what constitutes adequate consultation.⁶⁷ In the UK, the slow progress with only two active communities has led to reports that the government is considering reviewing the approach, with a former minister suggesting it’s “inevitable” to move away from pure consent to prioritize areas with the best geology. This has drawn sharp criticism from campaigners who warn it would lead to “more vociferous public resistance”.⁶⁷

Intergenerational stewardship

The immense timescales involved in radioactive decay—hundreds of thousands of years—elevate waste governance from a technical problem to a profound test of intergenerational stewardship and justice.⁶⁹^,⁷⁰

• The temporal mismatch: The central challenge is the mismatch between the half-life of isotopes like Plutonium-239 and the short planning horizons of human institutions (political cycles, corporate lifespans).⁶⁹^,⁷⁰ Stewardship is thus an ethical and institutional commitment to managing this “temporal debt” owed to future generations.⁷⁰

• Institutional persistence: This requires creating systems that ensure institutional memory, legal authority, and financial reserves are maintained across centuries.⁶⁹^,⁷⁰ Key governance principles to address this include:

o Redundancy: Multiple independent barriers (engineered and natural) to ensure containment even if one fails.⁶⁸

o Reversibility: Maintaining the capacity to retrieve waste before final sealing, allowing for future scientific advances or societal changes.⁶⁸

o Information preservation: Actively managing not just the waste, but the information about it—keeping warnings and records understandable to future societies who may lack our technical context.⁶⁸

Financing mechanisms and cradle-to-grave obligations

Ensuring that funds are available when needed for decommissioning and waste disposal is important to responsible governance, based on the “polluter pays” or “producers pay” principle. This requires sophisticated, legally mandated financial planning that covers the entire supply chain—from fuel provision to final disposal, a concept known as cradle-to-grave responsibility.⁷¹

Two prominent examples illustrate how this is structured:

1. Switzerland’s dedicated fund system

Switzerland operates two independent, publicly supervised funds to cover future liabilities:

• Decommissioning fund: Established in 1984, it covers the costs of dismantling nuclear facilities and disposing of the resulting waste.⁵

o Disposal fund: Established in 2000, it covers the management of operational waste and spent fuel after decommissioning, including final deep geological disposal.⁵ For operation, contributions are calculated based on estimated future costs (e.g.,.¹⁹ billion CHF for decommissioning, 12 billion CHF for disposal) and a presumed 40-year operational life. Funds are professionally invested by banks under strict guidelines to grow against inflation. Oversight is provided by management, investment, and cost committees with representatives from operators, regulators, and the government.⁷²

2. The US Maine’s Nuclear Decommissioning Financing Act

This U.S. state-level legislation mandates a clear framework to ensure timely decommissioning to protect public health, safety, and the environment. The mechanism: requires the licensee to collect sufficient funds from customers (who benefit from the power) during the plant’s operating life. These funds are placed in an independent, tax-exempt trust fund for each plant and managed by a committee to ensure availability when needed, even in the event of premature closure.⁷³

The ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach in nuclear power development emphasizes comprehensive management of the entire supply chain, including fuel provision, technology adoption, and multi-layered licensing processes to ensure safety and regulatory compliance. This framework highlights that waste management is an integral part of the nuclear energy lifecycle, addressing the complexities of decommissioning and disposal from the outset. By integrating these elements, the approach aims to foster public trust through transparency and collaboration in ensuring that all aspects of nuclear energy are responsibly managed.

Water use, thermal discharge, and climate resilience

Power plants were the largest water users in industry sector the U.S. in 2005, withdrawing about 201 billion gallons per day—roughly 41% of freshwater withdrawals and 49% of all (fresh + saline) water use. Most of this water is used for cooling in thermoelectric generation: boilers create steam to spin turbines, then steam is condensed back to water using cooling water withdrawn from nearby rivers, lakes, or oceans. One of used cooling technologies is “Once-through cooling”, which withdraws large volumes, passes water through a condenser, then returns it warmer. Causes high mortality of aquatic life at intakes, thermal pollution, and vulnerability to drought/heat. New plants are prohibited from using once-through cooling.⁷⁴

Because once-through systems are highly water-intensive and environmentally harmful, the EPA is issuing standards for cooling water at existing plants. A consistent national policy is recommended to phase out antiquated once-through systems in favor of less water-intensive technologies.⁷⁴

Closed-loop cooling systems⁷⁴^,⁷⁵^,⁷⁶

Closed-loop (recirculating) cooling systems route condenser water to a cooling source (typically cooling towers) where heat transfers to the ambient air; the cooled water is then returned to the condenser for reuse. These systems can use wet cooling, dry cooling, or hybrids of both. By recirculating cooling water rather than discharging it back to the original source, closed-cycle cooling has been the technology of choice for most power plants since the early 1970s and typically reduces water withdrawals and associated aquatic impacts by about 95% compared with once-through systems.

Operationally, closed recirculating systems offer several additional advantages: their small makeup-water requirements simplify control of waterside problems because makeup is only needed for leakage or maintenance; the limited makeup demand allows use of high-quality makeup water, which minimizes scale, biological fouling (slime and algae), and corrosion, and thereby reduces risks of mechanical failures such as cracked cylinders, broken heads, and fouled exchangers.⁷⁶ Because recirculating water is not continuously saturated with oxygen, corrosion rates are generally lower; the only significant oxygen ingress points are the surge tank surface, pump packings, and makeup water, so adequate treatment can virtually eliminate corrosion product accumulation.

However, closed-cycle systems do lose more water to evaporation than once-through systems, so their consumptive (non-returning) water use is higher despite substantially lower withdrawals.

Siting near alternative water sources

To reduce competition for freshwater resources, nuclear power plants can be sited to utilize alternative water sources for cooling. A prominent real-world example is the Palo Verde Generating Station in Arizona, which is uniquely situated in the desert and does not use freshwater for cooling. According to a study conducted in collaboration with Arizona Public Service (the plant’s operator) and the Idaho National Laboratory, Palo Verde uses treated effluent (reclaimed water) from municipal wastewater treatment plants.⁷⁷ This strategy not only secures a cooling water source in a water-scarce region but also beneficially reuses a waste stream. The research explored further innovations, such as supplementing this effluent with desalinated brackish groundwater. The study investigated the economic viability of coupling a reverse osmosis desalination plant with the nuclear facility. The key finding was that while using brackish water directly is limited by its salinity, treating it via RO could allow for greater use. However, the economics become significantly more favorable if the desalination plant also produces potable water for sale to local municipalities, in addition to cooling water for the power plant.⁷⁷

Heat-rate performance under heat waves

The performance and reliability of nuclear power plants are vulnerable to rising ambient temperatures and heat waves, which directly impact their thermodynamic efficiency and compliance with environmental rules. The “heat rate” of a power plant is a measure of its thermal efficiency—how much fuel energy is needed to produce a unit of electricity. Higher ambient temperatures, especially of cooling water, reduce the plant’s ability to reject waste heat, thus lowering its efficiency (i.e., increasing the heat rate). A significant econometric study using European datasets found that a rise in temperature of 1°C can reduce nuclear power supply by about 0.5% due to this effect on thermal efficiency. During extreme events like droughts and heat waves, the production loss can exceed 2.0% per degree Celsius.⁷⁸ extreme weather, particularly heatwaves combined with water scarcity, poses a direct threat to nuclear reliability. These conditions have led to partial or full shutdowns of nuclear facilities across several European countries, including France, Germany, and Switzerland, as rivers like the Rhine and Rhône experience declining water levels and rising temperatures. This creates a critical tension between maintaining electricity supply (energy security) and adhering to environmental mandates that prevent the discharge of overly warm cooling water back into rivers, which would harm aquatic life.⁷⁹

Adaptation measures (dry cooling, hybrid systems)

Dry cooling systems

Dry cooling replaces evaporative wet cooling with air-cooled systems to eliminate evaporative water loss where freshwater is scarce, but it entails clear trade-offs: because dry systems reject heat toward ambient dry-bulb temperature rather than the dew point, condenser backpressure rises and thermal efficiency falls—typical annual generation loss is around 2%, with peak hot-hour penalties up to ~25% in extreme heat—while capital costs and physical footprint are substantially higher (direct systems may require ~2.2× the footprint and ~1.9× the height of wet towers). Direct (air-cooled condenser) designs condense turbine steam directly in finned tubes and must be located adjacent to the turbine, whereas indirect designs use an intermediate water loop and remote finned exchangers, offering better operational control and siting (including natural-draft towers) at the expense of additional cost and somewhat lower thermal efficiency. Overall, dry cooling is appropriate when water scarcity or regulatory constraints mandate reduced water use, but selection should follow rigorous quantification of seasonal and peak-capacity penalties and consider indirect designs or complementary efficiency and demand-management measures to mitigate revenue and reliability risks.⁷⁵

Hybrid cooling systems⁷⁵

Hybrid cooling blends dry (air-cooled) and wet (evaporative) methods to minimize water use in arid regions while preserving turbine/output performance during peak ambient temperatures. They offer a practical, site-adaptive middle ground, providing substantial water conservation relative to fully wet towers while avoiding the full efficiency penalty of all-dry cooling during peak heat. Optimal design requires balancing seasonal demand profiles, wet-bulb statistics, marginal plant value at peak times, and capital/operational costs.

Operational strategy:

• Dry system carries the load in non-peak conditions (zero or minimal water use).

• Wet system is activated during hot, high-demand periods to restore turbine back-pressure and rated output.

• Hybrid designs are sized on techno-economic tradeoffs: water saved vs. capital/operating costs and control complexity.

Tradeoffs and practical issues:

• Water savings vs. increased capital, complexity (two circuits or combined complex structures), controls, and parallel auxiliary equipment.

• Potential use for plume abatement (mainly wet with some dry to lower exhaust RH) — not water-saving focused.

• Multiple commercially deployed topologies exist; choice depends on site climate (wet-bulb characteristics), water availability, economics, and plant layout. Example: San Juan 500 MWe uses large induced-draft towers combining air-cooled modules and evaporative sections.

Advanced hybrid designs:

Technical literature details innovations like the Combined Natural Draft Hybrid Cooling System (CNDHC) for inland plants. This design integrates dry and wet cooling sections to balance energy and water consumption. Research indicates that in arid regions, a hybrid system can have a monthly average circulating water consumption rate more than 270 kg/s lower than a traditional natural draft wet cooling system, with an average monthly back pressure reduction of.¹¹ kPa, which affects efficiency. The study emphasizes that hybrid cooling demonstrates minimal performance sensitivity to changing environmental conditions, offering broader regional applicability than purely dry or wet systems.⁸⁰

4 Social impact

The social impact of nuclear energy is a complex and often contested field, shaped by shifting perceptions, geopolitical contexts, and the evolving energy landscape. From its earliest days, nuclear power has evoked both support and distrust. Support for a clean, abundant energy and technological progress, and distrust due to its connection to weapons, radiation, and large-scale disasters. The public acceptance of nuclear power has therefore always been volatile, highly dependent on context, trust in institutions, and societal values. Historically, nuclear energy was promoted as a symbol of progress, but its association with catastrophic risks has fundamentally influenced how it is perceived.⁴⁶^,⁴⁷^,⁴⁹^,⁸¹^,⁸²^,⁵⁴^,⁸³

One of the most significant factors limiting nuclear expansion has been public resistance. From the 1970s onward, anti-nuclear movements across Europe, especially in countries like France and West Germany, linked their activism to historical injustices and dystopian fears about the nuclear future.³⁶ Protests at sites like Wyhl in Germany and Superphénix in France effectively delayed or halted reactor construction, demonstrating the powerful role of civil disobedience in shaping energy policy.⁴⁶ Similar patterns emerged in Eastern Europe. In Poland, public opposition in the 1980s and 1990s led to the cancellation of nuclear projects in Żarnowiec and Klempicz due to safety concerns.⁴³

While opposition has historically focused on the perceived risks of nuclear accidents, such as Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011), these events also triggered broader concerns about waste disposal, environmental justice, and institutional trust. The Chernobyl disaster is estimated to have caused between 4.000 and 60.000 premature deaths, and although such events are statistically rare, they have disproportionately shaped public discourse.³⁷ As Duffey and D’Auria (2021) note, the dual legacy of nuclear technology as both peaceful and destructive continues to generate societal distrust, especially when safety culture or transparent governance is lacking.⁸²

Public skepticism is not always grounded in technical knowledge but is often shaped by associations with nuclear weapons, secrecy, and elite control. According to Carpintero-Santamarsia (2023), opposition is often based on misconceptions, which are nevertheless sustained by a lack of communication, transparency, and social inclusion in decision-making processes.⁸⁴ In this sense, nuclear power’s struggle is not merely technological but social, as it lacks informal societal acceptance needed to operate with legitimacy.⁸⁵ As a result, public perception remains a barrier to expansion, especially in democratic societies where civil resistance can influence policy.³⁷

Despite these challenges, nuclear power has delivered positive social impacts, especially in terms of public health and job creation. Its capacity to reduce air pollution compared to fossil fuels has helped avoid millions of premature deaths globally. For example, nuclear power has helped prevent over 1.84 million deaths related to air pollution between 1971 and 2009, while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions significantly.³⁹ In Upstate New York alone, continued operation of nuclear plants avoided 16 million tons of CO₂ emissions per year and hundreds of millions of dollars in health-related social costs.²⁴

Moreover, nuclear projects provide significant employment opportunities. According to the IAEA (2024), large nuclear construction sites can employ up to 10.000 people during peak phases, with additional long-term employment in operation, maintenance, and regulatory oversight.²⁶ These jobs are often high-skilled and well-paid, contributing to regional economic development. SMRs further enhance nuclear’s social role by addressing energy access in remote and underserved areas, offering the possibility to reduce social inequality and support industrialization in emerging markets. Access to reliable, low-carbon electricity supports not only education and healthcare systems but also economic resilience.²⁶

The social benefits of nuclear energy are also closely tied to public financing and governance structures. Public-private partnerships have proven effective in spreading financial risk while enhancing public trust, especially when governments are visibly involved in ensuring safety and accountability.³^,²⁶ Participatory decision-making and stakeholder engagement are essential, particularly in emerging economies where safety culture is still developing.⁸⁶

A recent empirical study by Alsagr et al. (2024) supports the idea that human capital is a critical enabler of nuclear energy investment. They found evidence indicating that social development and nuclear advancement go hand in hand.⁸¹ This reinforces the view that education, expertise, and public trust are key to the social legitimacy of nuclear power. Furthermore, as de Groot et al. (2020) show, higher benefit perceptions are more important than risk perceptions in shaping public attitudes If citizens believe nuclear energy provides clear benefits, such as clean air, stable power, or local jobs, they are more likely to support it, particularly when trust in institutions is strong.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, not all social impacts are positive. The entire nuclear fuel chain, from uranium mining to waste storage, produces hazardous materials with potential for intergenerational injustice. Höffken and Ramana (2023) highlight that indigenous communities often bear the brunt of uranium mining, suffering from land dispossession, environmental degradation, and health issues.⁸⁸ These practices perpetuate historical inequalities, challenging the statement that nuclear power enables social sustainability. To actively counteract these historical injustices, modern responsible uranium procurement is grounded in the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), whereby mining companies are supposed to get the approval of the Indigenous people before any mining takes place.⁸⁹ The revised 2024 framework will necessitate continuous, transparent dialogue and thorough human rights due diligence so that all parties fully grasp the social implications of the project over its life cycle.⁸⁹ Securement of this “social license to operate” is vital for project sustainability, as it will enable the alignment of business interests with local economic benefits and cultural heritage.⁹⁰ Furthermore, The inclusion of ESG clauses in procurement contracts is to hold the suppliers liable to certain environmental and social performance goals, such as reducing carbon emissions and respecting human rights.⁹¹ To ensure the achievement of such goals, third-party audits are conducted to assess the mining operations and ensure they align with international safety and labor regulations.⁹⁰

Additionally, the global employment effects of nuclear and renewable energy transitions remain contested. While nuclear projects create jobs locally, a study by Almutairi et al. (2024) suggest that a shift toward nuclear and renewables could lead to a net loss of 4.45 million jobs worldwide by 2030, especially in fossil fuel dependent regions. However,Using data from 2018 to forecast outcomes in 2030 may not be accurate because of the change in energy security policy after the pandemic. According to the IEA (2023) World Energy Outlook, a total of 30 million jobs will be created in the field of clean energy by 2030, offsetting the 13 million jobs expected to be lost in the fossil fuel sector.⁹² Thus, while nuclear energy contributes positively to social welfare in certain regions, it may also disrupt livelihoods elsewhere, underlining the need for just transition frameworks that address displacement and retraining.⁹³

Social acceptance is thus a multidimensional issue, shaped by historical memory, perceived risks and benefits, governance quality, and community engagement. As Ho & Kristiansen (2018) point out, acceptance depends heavily on trust in authorities, political ideology, and education level.⁵⁴ Social networks and interpersonal communication also play a role in amplifying perceptions, either positively or negatively.⁸⁷ Even factors like urban density can indirectly affect ecological and social outcomes, as denser cities tend to use resources more efficiently and reduce environmental pressures.⁹⁴

Practical steps: Early consultation⁹⁵

Early consultation is a cornerstone for meaningful citizen participation in policy-making. The OECD emphasizes engaging citizens and stakeholders at the earliest stages of the policy cycle—during problem definition and options development—so public voices shape objectives, trade-offs and design choices rather than only reacting to near-final proposals. Early engagement increases legitimacy, surfaces diverse knowledge (local, experiential and technical), helps identify unintended consequences and builds social license for decisions that affect communities.

Key practical measures for implementing early consultation

• Plan consultation at project inception: Integrate consultation milestones into the policy or project timeline so engagement is not an afterthought. Define objectives for early consultation (e.g., identify priorities, reveal local impacts, test assumptions) and link outcomes to subsequent design steps.

• Map and reach relevant stakeholders: Identify affected groups, marginalized populations and intermediaries (community organizations, local leaders, technical experts). Use multiple outreach channels to reduce barriers to participation and ensure inputs reflect diverse perspectives.

• Use accessible, problem-focused formats: Frame early engagement around clear questions about problems and needs rather than detailed technical solutions. Employ deliberative formats (workshops, focus groups, town halls) and simple materials to make discussions accessible to non-experts.

• Provide timely, understandable information: Share concise background materials explaining context, objectives and potential options. Avoid technical jargon; use visuals and plain language so participants can contribute meaningfully from the start.

• Allocate sufficient time and resources: Early consultation requires time for outreach, capacity-building and iterative feedback. Budget for facilitation, translation, venue or digital platforms, and compensation when appropriate to support inclusion.

• Build iterative feedback loops: Commit to reporting back—explain how early input influenced subsequent analysis or design choices. Use summaries, public minutes or short updates to show participants their contributions were heard and to maintain trust.

• Combine methods to surface both breadth and depth of input: Use broad public surveys to identify common concerns and targeted deliberative processes to explore trade-offs and co-design potential solutions.

• Safeguard inclusiveness and equity: Proactively remove participation barriers (timing, childcare, transport, accessibility, digital access). Target outreach to underrepresented groups and consider measures (stipends, community hosts) to enable sustained involvement.

Expected benefits

• Improved problem framing and relevance of options, reducing the likelihood of costly redesigns later.

• Greater legitimacy and public acceptance, lowering conflict and delays.

• Discovery of local knowledge and context-specific solutions that improve policy effectiveness.

• Early identification of distributional impacts and mitigation needs.

Monitoring and institutionalisation

• Track indicators of early consultation quality (diversity of participants, number of inputs that informed design, participant satisfaction).

• Institutionalise requirements or guidance for early-stage engagement within policy development procedures to ensure consistent practice across agencies.

• Provide training and toolkits for officials and facilitators on designing and running effective early consultations.

Benefit-sharing⁴⁴

Hosting nuclear facilities can provide socio-economic benefits to local communities, including reliable low-carbon electricity, medical isotope production and broader economic development. communicating these benefits and demonstrating tangible returns helps build local support, turning initial skepticism into advocacy. formal associations and national support can translate national and industry gains into local value, and external funding for municipal studies can document and amplify the benefits for host communities.

Local hiring⁴⁴

Nuclear facilities are associated with substantial local employment, including high-paying jobs tied to construction, operation and supply chains. highlighting these employment opportunities and supporting workforce readiness helps connect residents to the economic prospects generated by research reactors, power plants and waste management projects. municipal involvement and national programs can facilitate training and pathways into these jobs.

Health, safety and emergency preparedness⁴⁴

Addressing public concerns about safety and radioactive waste requires robust health, safety and emergency preparedness measures and ongoing monitoring. the IAEA’s Safety Standards, expert missions and technical meetings support reliable operation and community reassurance. regular, transparent face-to-face engagement and communication tailored to local contexts are critical for demonstrating that health risks are managed and for building collaborative trust.

Support for municipalities and institutional backing⁴⁴

National backing and institutional mechanisms help host municipalities manage the long timelines and unique challenges of nuclear projects. formal host-community associations, national programs and external funding enable municipalities to conduct independent studies, share knowledge, influence policy and secure resources for outreach. these supports strengthen local engagement, capacity and the ability to address long-term requirements such as geological repositories.

Practical steps in transparency⁹⁵

• Ensure open access to all relevant documents, data and meeting records so citizens can review evidence, assumptions and decision rationales at each policy stage.

• Publish clear timelines, decision points and responsible actors so stakeholders know when and how their input will be considered.

• Disclose conflicts of interest, funding sources and expert affiliations linked to policy options or advisory groups to guard against undue influence.

• Use plain-language summaries and visualisations of technical analyses and trade-offs to make complex information understandable for non-experts.

• Provide searchable, machine-readable datasets and metadata to enable independent analysis and reuse by civil society, researchers and journalists.

• Establish formal channels for questions and clarifications (public Q&A portals, dedicated contact points) with commitments to timely responses.

• Apply consistent recordkeeping and archival practices so past consultations, decisions and follow-up actions are retrievable and auditable.

• Report how public inputs affected final choices by publishing response matrices or decision logs that map contributions to outcomes.

• Set measurable transparency indicators (e.g., documents published within set timeframes, response rates to information requests) and monitor them regularly.

• Embed transparency requirements in institutional procedures and guidance so openness is a routine obligation across agencies.

In conclusion, the social impact of nuclear energy is neither uniformly positive nor negative. It offers real benefits: clean air, stable energy, skilled employment, and opportunities for energy equity. Yet it also poses serious challenges: from historical trauma and environmental justice concerns to communication failures and institutional mistrust. If nuclear energy is to play a greater role in the future, especially in addressing climate change and energy poverty, it must secure not only technological and economic viability but also a strong social license grounded in equity, participation, and transparency.

5 Political and legal aspects

The political and legal dimensions of nuclear energy are deeply entwined with its technological development, global diffusion, and public perception. From its inception, political motives have significantly shaped the trajectory of nuclear power. As Josephson and Kasperski (2022) emphasize, political influences were central to the spread of nuclear systems, particularly through the wartime and postwar military and foreign policy strategies of dominant global powers.⁴⁹ This interplay between political agendas and nuclear development has persisted through the decades, from Cold War-era proliferation to contemporary energy strategies.

Postcolonial and geopolitical dynamics have also influenced the nuclear landscape. Regions such as Eastern Europe, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine were historically dependent on Soviet nuclear technology, exemplifying a form of nuclear colonialism.⁴⁹ These legacies continue to affect environmental governance and technological autonomy. In contrast, emerging powers like China are actively exporting their nuclear expertise, promoting high-temperature gas reactor technologies in countries like Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United Arad Emirates, and Indonesia¹⁶, thereby reshaping geopolitical alliances through energy diplomacy.

The international community has sought to coordinate nuclear innovation through collaborative efforts such as the Generation IV International Forum, formed in 2001 by nine countries. This initiative focuses on the development of sustainable, economical, and safe nuclear reactors with enhanced resistance to proliferation.¹⁶ Meanwhile, in response to growing climate concerns, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has advocated for a doubling of nuclear power by 2050, contributing to an electricity mix with at least 80 percent from low-carbon sources.¹¹

Contemporary energy security concerns, especially those amplified by the war in Ukraine and the EU’s efforts to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, have further pushed nuclear energy into the political spotlight.⁶² As countries struggle with low energy independence, national energy strategies are becoming increasingly individualized, prioritizing reliability and sovereignty over harmonized EU-wide policies. In this context, the European Union’s policy ambitions, such as increasing the share of nuclear power to 40 percent by 2030⁸⁴, are both a political and technological response to urgent energy and climate challenges. The mentioned notion of a “40% nuclear mandate” is not based on actual facts since the European Union does not support any particular technology with any particular percentages for its member states. Instead, the policy environment has moved to support technology neutrality, as with the Green Deal.⁹⁶ In 2024, the European Union officially adopted the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which recognizes nuclear energy, including traditional large-scale nuclear plants, Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), and the next-generation “Gen IV” reactors, as a strategic net-zero industry. This means that nuclear energy projects will be able to take advantage of a streamlined permitting process and easier access to funding.⁹⁶ A group of about 14 European Union member states (led by France) has agreed to form an alliance to achieve a goal of 150 GW of nuclear energy by 2050. This will maintain the current share of 25% of the European Union’s electricity supply that nuclear energy currently represents while increasing the total electricity demand.⁹⁶ The role of nuclear power within the EU has shifted to a complementary role to renewables to achieve “Climate Neutrality” by 2050, and this role is to provide the “firm” power supply that renewables cannot provide during off peak generation times.⁹⁶

Government support is critical in enabling nuclear deployment. According to the IAEA (2024), such support includes direct financial mechanisms like loan guarantees, green bonds, export credits, and risk-sharing tools such as those outlined in the OECD’s Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.²⁶ These mechanisms are essential for attracting private investment, particularly needed in capital-intensive projects such as nuclear energy. National initiatives, such as Canada’s Green Bond Framework, aim to reinforce the position of nuclear energy within sustainable finance markets.³⁰

Emerging technologies such as SMRs require specific policy frameworks to thrive. The IAEA’s Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative addresses this by seeking to streamline industrial and regulatory processes, thus fostering investor confidence and commercial feasibility. Governments can further support this process through grants and guarantees, especially in developing countries where regulatory systems may still be underdeveloped.²⁶

Studies by Luan et al. (2024) and Alsagr et al (2024) identify political stability as a crucial enabler of nuclear development. Stable governments attract foreign direct investment and reduce regulatory uncertainties, facilitating long-term infrastructure projects like nuclear power plants.⁸¹^,⁹⁷ Political volatility, in contrast, amplifies investment risk, as seen in Germany’s nuclear phase-out, while stable frameworks like South Korea’s Barakah project illustrate how engineering challenges can be managed under supportive governance structures.⁶⁴

Moreover, opposition to nuclear power has historically stemmed from concerns about democracy, safety, and societal acceleration. In the 1970s, anti-nuclear protests framed the technology as a symbol of irreversible, undemocratic industrialization.³⁶ Sengupta (2023) states that even today, public distrust persists, particularly regarding safety, waste disposal, and transparency. Therefore policies aimed at rebuilding trust, such as public consultations and community engagement, are deemed essential by the author.⁴⁷

Finally, the inclusion of nuclear energy in green taxonomies, such as the EU Green Deal, remains controversial. While proponents highlight its low-carbon credentials and potential to stabilize energy systems, critics warn of greenwashing and the masking of long-term ecological and security risks.¹⁹^,⁴³

In sum, nuclear energy policy sits at the intersection of security, climate, economy, and societal values. The success of its future development depends not only on technological innovation but also on cohesive, transparent, and adaptable policy frameworks that address both national interests and global climate goals.

The international nuclear liability regimes

There is no single global nuclear liability regime, but rather a network of interconnected conventions. The two primary treaties are the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention. The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) was later established to create a global framework bridging these systems.

The international nuclear liability regimes are built upon four key bases:⁹⁸^,⁹⁹

Strict (absolute) liability: The operator of a nuclear installation is held liable for nuclear damage regardless of fault, ensuring that victims do not need to prove negligence. This principle provides a straightforward path for compensation, as highlighted in various international agreements.⁹⁹

Exclusive liability (legal channeling): All liability for a nuclear incident is channeled exclusively to the operator of the nuclear installation. This principle protects suppliers, vendors, and transporters from being sued directly, offering them the legal certainty necessary to participate in the nuclear market. According to the Vienna Convention, “no person other than the operator shall be liable for nuclear damage.”⁹⁹

Limited liability in amount: The operator’s liability is capped at a specific amount, which is essential for making risks manageable and ensuring financial predictability. This cap is determined by national law in accordance with international conventions, allowing operators to secure necessary insurance. Under the current Paris/Brussels system, liability is set to £140 million, with government contributions bringing the total to SDR 300 million. As per the recent government order from May 2016, operators are required to have insurance of €1.2 billion. Initially proposed under the 2004 Paris/Brussels Protocol, this liability level was set at €700 million, with plans to increase it by €100 million annually. However, as of March 2021, the changes in the liability regime had not yet come into force.⁹⁹

Limited liability in time: Claims for nuclear damage must be brought within a fixed period, typically 10 to 30 years from the date of the incident, after which the right to compensation lapses. However, this crucial aspect of the liability framework is not explicitly covered in the majority of current documents, leaving an important gap in understanding the timelines for victims seeking compensation.⁹⁹

The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy

The Paris Convention (PC), established in 1960, creates an international framework for nuclear accident liability and compensation, ensuring the nuclear industry’s growth is not stifled by excessive liabilities while providing sufficient compensation for damages.¹⁰⁰

Key principles¹⁰⁰

• Operator liability: Nuclear installation operators are strictly liable for accidents, independent of fault, differing from general tort law.

• Minimum liability amounts: Operators must maintain a minimum liability of EUR 700 million; lower amounts apply for low-risk operations (EUR 70 million for installations and EUR 80 million for transport).

• Financial security: Operators must have financial security matching their liability to ensure claims can be settled.

• Limitation periods: Legal action must be initiated within 30 years for personal injury or loss of life and 10 years for other damages, with some exceptions.

Compensation and coverage¹⁰⁰

Compensation is provided for:

• Loss of life or personal injury.

• Property damage.

• Economic losses and environmental remediation.

• Preventive measures taken against hazards.

Damage to the nuclear installation itself is not covered.

Definition of nuclear installations¹⁰⁰

Nuclear installations include:

• Reactors.

• Facilities for manufacturing, processing, or storing nuclear substances.

• Disposal installations.

• Decommissioning facilities.

Some low-radioactivity facilities may fall under general tort law.

Transport provisions¹⁰⁰

The convention governs nuclear substances in transport, making the shipping operator primarily liable. Special provisions exist for transporting substances between operators in non-contracting states.

Jurisdiction and scope¹⁰⁰

The Paris Convention applies to both contracting and non-contracting parties under specific conditions, allowing claims to be addressed in the courts of affected territories. Coastal states have special jurisdiction provisions for incidents within their exclusive economic zones.

Adoption and amendments¹⁰⁰

Adopted under the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Paris Convention is open to any OECD member and non-members with approval from existing parties. It has been updated through protocols in 1964, 1982, and 2004. The OECD Secretary-General is the depositary for the Convention.

The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage⁹⁸

The Vienna Convention established in 1963 73 to lay the foundation for legal framework for addressing nuclear damage resulting from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Convention aims to provide minimum financial protection standards and foster international cooperation.

Key terms are defined, including “Person,” “Operator,” “Installation State,” and “Nuclear Damage.” Operators are primarily liable for damages caused by nuclear incidents at their installations and during the transport of nuclear materials. Liability becomes effective based on specific conditions set forth in the text.

The operator’s liability is generally considered absolute, although there are exclusions, such as damages resulting from gross negligence, acts of war, or exceptional natural disasters, unless local legislation provides otherwise. The Convention emphasizes the need for operators to secure financial backing, requiring them to provide certificates of financial security from insurers to ensure that compensation claims can be met.⁹⁸

Compensation claims must be pursued within a designated timeframe—typically ten years after an incident. However, under certain conditions, this period may be extended, especially if the operator’s liability is covered by insurance beyond ten years.⁹⁸

The Convention thus provides a comprehensive legal structure for accountability and compensation in the event of nuclear incidents, contributing to the safe use of nuclear energy while promoting international cooperation and mutual legal recognition among parties involved.⁹⁸

The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)¹⁰¹ seeks to establish a baseline national compensation amount for nuclear incidents and enhance this amount through public funding from Contracting Parties if the national compensation proves inadequate. This Convention is accessible not only to countries that are parties to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage or the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (including amendments) but also to other nations whose domestic laws align with the uniform civil liability rules detailed in the Convention’s Annex. The CSC was adopted on 12 September 1997 and entered into force on 15 April 2015. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the depositary.

Amendment to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage¹⁰¹

An Amendment to the CSC was endorsed on 13 January 2026 during a Diplomatic Conference held on 13-14 January 2026. This Amendment eliminates the obligation for countries without nuclear reactors to contribute to the CSC’s supplementary international fund by adjusting the contribution calculation formula outlined in Article IV.1(b) of the Convention.

The Amendment will take effect once all Contracting Parties to the CSC, as of that date, have submitted instruments indicating their agreement to the amendment. Following the Amendment’s entry into force, a signatory State can join as a party by depositing an instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval in line with Articles XVIII and XX.². Other States may only join through accession, as per Articles XIX and XX.². The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will continue to serve as the depositary.

Operator insurance requirements and risk management among utilities

Operator insurance requirements¹⁰²:

In Germany, operators of nuclear installations are subject to stringent insurance requirements under the German Atomic Act (AtG). Key requirements include:

• Unlimited liability: Operators are held strictly liable for damages resulting from nuclear incidents, meaning they must be prepared to compensate victims without limit.

• Financial security: Operators are required to maintain private financial security proportional to the potential hazards associated with their activities. Specifically, a minimum of DM 5 million is mandated for the first MWth, scaling up to a maximum of DM 500 million for larger installations.

• Revisions and adjustments: The financial security amounts are supposed to be revised every five years to ensure they maintain their real value, although this adjustment has been neglected since 1977.

These financial requirements ensure that sufficient funds are available to compensate victims in the event of an accident.

Risk management among utilities¹⁰²:

Risk management in the nuclear sector involves collaboration among operators to mitigate financial exposure:

• Nuclear liability partnership: Operators collaborate through partnerships to collectively manage the financial risks associated with nuclear liabilities. This communal effort helps distribute large-scale potential liabilities and enhances overall risk management.

• Pooling resources: The German Nuclear Insurance Pool (DKVG) focuses on covering risks associated with nuclear reactor operations. Member companies share the financial burdens of third-party liabilities and material damages, providing a safety net that allows them to better handle claims and losses.

• Legal framework: The framework dictates strict legal obligations, which guides operators in how they manage risks. It empowers utilities to collectively formulate strategies for compliance while ensuring they uphold their liabilities.

This cooperative approach helps utilities better assess and navigate the risks presented by their operations while ensuring compliance with regulatory standards.

Proliferation resistance and export controls

Geopolitical and compliance risks

Geopolitical and compliance risks in nuclear supply chains

• High geographic concentration: Mining, conversion and enrichment are dominated by a few countries (Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia for uranium mining; Russia and a small number of Western facilities for conversion/enrichment). That creates single-country failure risk.¹⁰³

• Technology transfer sensitivities: Enrichment and reprocessing technologies carry inherently higher proliferation risk than power reactors or fuel assemblies, justifying transaction-by-transaction licensing scrutiny.¹⁰⁴

• Vertical concentration: A small set of firms and facilities control large shares at each stage (uranium concentrate, conversion, enrichment), so outages or policy shifts at a few nodes ripple through the whole fuel cycle.¹⁰³

• Transport/transit bottlenecks: Key shipping routes and transit hubs (including routes via/near Russia) are chokepoints; sanctions, insurance problems or route closures can disrupt flows even if production continues.¹⁰³

• Feedstock and input dependencies: Suppliers rely on other inputs (e.g., sulfuric acid) and global logistics; shortages or input-price spikes can limit production capacity.¹⁰³

• Policy and sanction risk: Western moves to restrict Russian fuel services and potential Russian retaliation increase uncertainty and accelerate reshoring/relocation costs, tightening near-term supply.¹⁰³

• Concentrated inventories: Utilities’ and traders’ stockpiles are limited and unevenly held, so concentrated owners can influence spot markets and price volatility.¹⁰³

• Time lags to diversify: Building new mines, conversion and enrichment capacity takes years/decades, so market concentration cannot be relieved quickly — making the system vulnerable to shocks.¹⁰³

Proliferation resistance

Proliferation Resistance is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as: “characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse of technology, by States intent on acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”.¹⁰³ Guidance is provided by two primary international methodologies.

• The GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Methodology⁷²: Developed by the Generation IV International Forum, this is a technical, “pathways evaluation” approach. It assesses a system’s response to hypothetical proliferation scenarios (diversion, misuse of facilities, clandestine facilities).

o Key Concept: It evaluates both intrinsic features (technical design features like material barriers, isotopic barriers, and facility design that are inherently difficult to misuse) and extrinsic measures (IAEA safeguards and physical protection systems).

o Application: The methodology is designed to be used early in the design phase (especially for Small Modular Reactors and advanced reactors) to build in resistance, allowing designers to assess “where and how one might implement safeguards, in order to guide conceptual design decisions”.

• The IAEA INPRO Methodology: The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) provides a broader assessment manual. Unlike the detailed technical pathway analysis of PR&PP, INPRO acts as a “best-practices checklist” aimed at helping Member States, particularly those embarking on nuclear power, assess sustainable nuclear energy systems. It emphasizes the consensus view of international experts on defining intrinsic features and the application of extrinsic measures like safeguards

Organizational impacts of proliferation resistance requirements

Direct organizational obligations

Organizations operating within the nuclear energy sector face multifaceted obligations arising from proliferation resistance (PR) requirements. At the foundational level, entities must establish and maintain a robust legal and compliance framework that implements international commitments, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), and the Additional Protocol, while designating a competent regulatory authority to oversee safeguards implementation.¹⁰⁵ In the design and engineering phase, organizations are increasingly expected to integrate PR features through “Safeguards by Design” (SBD) approaches, documenting intrinsic characteristics—such as material form, isotopic composition, and process complexity—that facilitate verification and reduce attractiveness for diversion.⁶⁶ During operations, facilities must implement a State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC), enable IAEA containment and surveillance measures, and maintain transparent information flows to support safeguards evaluation and timely detection of anomalies.¹⁰⁶ Supply chain management introduces further obligations: organizations must verify end-use commitments, apply export and import controls aligned with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and manage transfers of sensitive technologies with heightened scrutiny.¹⁰⁷ Finally, cost management considerations require organizations to account for the full lifecycle expenses associated with PR measures, including design modifications, safeguards implementation, and verification support activities.¹⁰⁸

Strategic implications for organizations

Beyond compliance obligations, proliferation resistance requirements carry significant strategic implications for organizational decision-making. First, early integration of PR features during conceptual design substantially reduces lifecycle costs; retrofitting safeguards into constructed facilities is demonstrably more expensive and technically challenging than embedding verification-friendly characteristics from the outset.¹⁰⁸ Second, multinational arrangements—such as international fuel cycle centers or jointly owned facilities—can enhance proliferation resistance by requiring consensus among multiple states for any diversion attempt, potentially reducing the safeguards burden on individual operators while strengthening political oversight.¹⁰⁹

Organizational expectations: Licensing, due diligence, and monitoring

Organizations engaged in nuclear supply chains must adopt a robust compliance culture. They are expected to understand that nuclear regulation is a continuous lifecycle, not a one-time approval.

• Understanding the licensing basis: In jurisdictions like Canada, regulatory documents (such as REGDOC-2.13.2) form part of the “licensing basis.” This means that guidance documents become legally binding requirements once referenced in a license. Organizations must understand that “shall” indicates a mandatory requirement, and they cannot be relieved of compliance by any other interpretation.¹¹⁰

• Supply chain integrity (counterfeits and fraud): Due diligence extends deep into the supply chain. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Group on Supply Chain (WGSUP) highlights the growing risk of Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI). Regulators expect licensees to have robust vendor oversight practices to verify the quality of products and services, ensuring that substandard parts do not compromise safety or security.¹¹¹

• Monitoring and continuous oversight: The regulatory process is dynamic. As outlined by the U.S. NRC, oversight includes not just licensing but also inspection, enforcement, and assessment of operational experience. Companies must have internal programs for “Events Assessment” (analyzing incidents) and responding to “Generic Communications” from regulators to address emerging safety issues.¹¹²

Fuel-cycle safeguards

Safeguards are the technical measures implemented by the IAEA and state regulators to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. The landscape is evolving due to advanced reactors.

• The “3S” approach (safety, security, and safeguards): Modern guidance emphasizes integrating these three functions from the earliest design stage. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), in collaboration with the IAEA, is leading efforts to promote “Safeguards by Design” (SBD). This ensures that for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and advanced reactors, verification measures are not an afterthought. Given that novel fuel types and long refueling intervals of SMRs pose distinct challenges, integrating safeguards early is crucial for efficient licensing and operation.¹¹³

• Legal obligation for access: In the United States for example, each licensee must let the Commission inspect special nuclear material and the premises where it is used, produced, or stored at reasonable times; provide records about receipt, possession, use, acquisition, import, export, or transfer of such material on reasonable notice; and, for fuel cycle facilities that fabricate or process reactor fuel, provide rent-free office space (with heat, A/C, lighting, power, and janitorial services) for Commission inspectors. Licensees must also give NRC resident inspectors and other designated inspectors immediate access comparable to regular employees after proper identification and required security and safety checks.¹¹⁴

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